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Evaluative conditioning of artificial grammars:  
Evidence that subjectively-unconscious structures bias affective evalua-
tions of novel stimuli 
 
Răzvan Jurchiș, Andrei Costea, Zoltan Dienes, Mircea Miclea, Adrian Opre 
 
 
Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to the acquisition of emotional valence by an initially-neutral stim-
ulus (conditioned stimulus; CS), after being paired with an emotional stimulus (unconditioned stimulus; 
US). An important issue regards whether, when participants are unaware of the CS-US contingency, 
the affective valence can generalize to new stimuli that share similarities with the CS. Previous studies 
have shown that generalization of EC effects appears only when participants are aware of the contin-
gencies, but we suggest that this is because (a) the contingencies typically used in these studies are 
salient and easy to detect consciously, and (b) the performance-based measures of awareness (so-called 
“objective measures”), typically used in these studies, tend to overestimate the amount of available 
conscious knowledge. We report a preregistered study in which participants (N = 217) were exposed 
to letter strings generated from two complex artificial grammars that are difficult to decipher con-
sciously. Stimuli from one grammar were paired with positive USs, while those from the other grammar 
were paired with negative USs. Subsequently, participants evaluated new, previously-unseen, stimuli 
from the positively-conditioned grammar more positively than new stimuli from the negatively-condi-
tioned grammar. Importantly, this effect appeared even when trial-by-trial subjective measures indi-
cated lack of relevant conscious knowledge. We provide evidence for the generalization of EC effects 
even without subjective awareness of the structures that enable those generalizations. 
Preregsitration https://osf.io/cbdu6  Supplementary materials: https://osf.io/5jgwp/ 
Keywords: evaluative conditioning; generalization; artificial grammar learning; implicit learning; emo-
tion 
 
Evaluative conditioning (EC) is defined as the ac-
quisition of positive or negative affective valence by an 
initially-neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus; CS), 
due to its co-occurrence with a positive or negative 
stimulus (unconditioned stimulus; US) (e.g., Levey & 
Martin, 1975). Decades of research have shown that 
this process can influence evaluations of initially-neu-
tral persons, social categories, brands, and various 
other types of stimuli (Hofmann et al., 2010).  
Most EC studies try to change the affective valence 
only for the specific CSs that are paired with the USs. 
However, in order for EC to have a significant impact 
in daily life, the effect must also generalize to previ-
ously-unseen stimuli that share similarities with the 
presented CSs (Hütter & Tigges, 2019; Unkelbach, 
Stahl, & Forderer, 2012). Moreover, a core objective 
for EC research has been to determine whether the con-
ditioning (e.g., Sweldens, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2014) 
and the generalization (e.g., Glaser & Kuchenbrandr, 
2017) effects can appear without the awareness of the 
contingencies formed between the CSs and the USs, be-
cause evaluations that are based on unconscious 
knowledge might have different properties from con-
sciously-based ones: For example, the former could be 
more difficult to change, to integrate with information 
from other sources (cf. Aust, Haaf, & Stahl, 2019; 
Baars, 1997), to communicate to other persons (Mer-
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cier & Sperber, 2018), to control or to prevent from in-
fluencing behavior (cf. Hütter, Sweldens, Unkelbach, 
& Klauer, 2012; Jacoby, 1991).  
In order to test whether generalization can occur 
without awareness, Glaser and Kuchenbrandt (2017) 
presented participants with two groups of alien crea-
tures. On their heads, members of one group had an an-
tenna, while members of the other group had a triangle-
shaped object. When members of one group were 
paired with negative (or positive) images, even previ-
ously-unseen creatures that had the same object on the 
head, were evaluated more negatively (or positively). 
Thus, this study has found evidence for generalization 
to new stimuli, but only when participants were aware 
of the contingencies (i.e., remembered accurately 
which group of creatures was associated with which va-
lence; for similar results, see Hütter, Kutzner, & 
Fiedler, 2014, and Hütter & Tigges, 2019). In conclu-
sion, generalization of EC effects to new stimuli seems 
possible, but the available evidence largely shows that 
generalization is dependent on awareness (contrast Ol-
son & Fazio, 2006; see Glaser & Kuchenbrandt, 2017, 
for a discussion). 
We argue that, even if generalization of EC would 
be possible without awareness, most studies present 
participants with simple regularities that are easy to de-
tect consciously: The CSs paired with a positive va-
lence are easily distinguishable from those paired with 
negative valence [e.g., they belong to clearly different 
and salient categories (e.g., men versus women in Hüt-
ter et al., 2014) and/or are differentiated by obvious 
cues (e.g., Glaser & Kuchenbrandt, 2017)]. Further-
more, these generalization studies typically use so-
called “objective” measures of awareness, which as-
sume that, if participants identify accurately the va-
lence the CSs have been paired with, they have con-
scious memory of the CS-US contingencies. However, 
these methods are biased towards overestimating the 
role of awareness in conditioning and in generalization 
effects (e.g., Sweldens et al., 2014; Sweldens, Tuk, & 
Hütter, 2017), because participants are able to identify 
accurately the valence from sources other than the con-
scious memories of the CS-US or CS-valence pairings: 
that is, from their affective reaction towards the CS 
(Hütter et al., 2012; Sweldens et al., 2014) and from 
implicit memory-based feelings of familiarity (Sweld-
ens et al., 2017; Timmermans & Cleeremans, 2015). 
                                                 
1 Although it has not been explicitly framed as a subjective 
method, the process-dissociation method developed by Hütter et al. 
(2012) is a subjective measure of awareness, since it requires par-
ticipants to respond contingent on their own assessment of their 
mental states. That is, for each CS, they have to introspectively as-
While alternative, subjective, measures of awareness 
have already begun to gain dominance in the study of 
EC (especially the process-dissociation method of Hüt-
ter et al., 2012)1, these measures are more difficult to 
adapt to generalizations studies, so they have not pene-
trated the generalization literature. In sum, most previ-
ous studies on the generalization of EC (a) employed 
methods that favour the development of conscious 
knowledge, by using salient contingencies and, further, 
(b) used measures that are suspected to overestimate 
the amount of conscious knowledge available to partic-
ipants. 
In the present study, we propose an approach that 
employs more complex regularities that are difficult to 
detect consciously, but that are nonetheless learned, 
producing mostly unconscious knowledge. Also, start-
ing from current theories of consciousness, such as 
Global Workspace and Higher-Order Thought theories, 
we use a subjective measure of awareness, which can 
be more specific in disentangling implicit from explicit 
influences (e.g., Dienes, 2012, LeDoux & Hofmann, 
2018; contrast Shanks, 2005), if specific conditions re-
garding the sensitivity, relevance, immediacy and reli-
ability of the measure are met (Berry & Dienes, 1993; 
Shanks & St John, 1994; Sweldens et al., 2014, 2017). 
The regularities that we use are called artificial 
grammars, and consist of complex sets of rules that 
specify permitted, “grammatical”, combinations of ele-
ments (Figure 1). In a typical Artificial Grammar 
Learning task (AGL; Reber, 1967), participants are pre-
sented with meaningless letter strings that, unknown to 
them, follow an artificial grammar. After exposure, 
participants are informed that the strings followed some 
rules, but nothing is disclosed about the rules’ configu-
ration. Then, they are presented with new strings, some 
of which follow the same grammar, some of which 
don’t. Participants’ task is to respond, for every string, 
whether it follows the grammar or not. The typical re-
sult is that participants are able to classify accurately 
new strings as “grammatical” or “non-grammatical”, 
even when they rely on subjectively-unconscious 
knowledge of the grammar (e.g., Dienes & Scott, 2005; 
Ivanchei & Moroskina, 2018; Norman & Price, 2012; 
Scott & Dienes, 2008, 2010; contrast Shanks, 2005; alt-
hough the task typically also produces some conscious 
knowledge). Moreover, several studies have shown that 
participants can learn two grammars, and classify new 
sess whether they have explicit memory for the CS-valence associ-
ation. In the Exclusion task, if they remember consciously the CS-
valence association, they have to respond contrary to their memory 
of the CS-valence association; if they do not remember the valence, 
they have to respond according to their attitude towards the CS.  
 EVALUATIVE CONDITIONING OF ARTIFICIAL GRAMMARS 3 
strings according to any of the two grammars (e.g., 
Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995; Norman, 
Scott, Price, & Dienes, 2016).  
 
The Present Study. 
 We propose a task in which, in an acquisition/con-
ditioning phase, strings generated according to one 
grammar are paired with negative stimuli, while strings 
generated according to the other grammar are paired 
with positive stimuli. For brevity, we call the grammar 
associated with negative stimuli “the negative gram-
mar”, and the grammar paired with positive stimuli, 
“the positive grammar”. We assume that participants 
will acquire structures coding the relations between the 
elements of the grammars, and between the elements of 
the grammar and the positive/negative affect. Accord-
ingly, in a subsequent test phase, we expect that partic-
ipants will evaluate new strings that follow the “posi-
tive grammar” more positively, compared to new 
strings that follow the “negative grammar”. In this case, 
it means that we have obtained a generalizable condi-
tioning effect, because participants evaluate previ-
ously-unseen strings.  
EC research is typically interested whether condi-
tioning effects occur when participants do not remem-
ber consciously (a) the specific US the evaluated CS has 
been paired with and/or (b) the valence the evaluated 
CS has been paired with (e.g., Sweldens et al., 2014). 
In contrast, in our task, participants do not evaluate CSs 
that have been directly paired with a US or with a va-
lence; they evaluate stimuli that contain elements from 
a grammar that has been associated with a valence. 
Therefore, while in standard EC and EC generalization 
studies the CSs are made more or less pleasant by the 
                                                 
2 These two reasons are analogous to the reasons for unawareness 
from typical EC and EC generalization studies: Participants could 
be unaware of the CS-valence relations either because (1) they can-
not remember consciously whether the CS has been presented in the 
established CS-US or CS-valence relations, the evalu-
ated strings in our task can be made more or less pleas-
ant by the relations between grammatical elements in 
their composition and a valence (e.g., between the frag-
ment RTV and a positive valence). Note that, even if 
participants learned some elements of the grammar 
(e.g, that TV appeared after R), if they did not also learn 
that those elements were related with a valence, the 
generalized EC effect could not appear. In conclusion, 
we are interested, for each string, whether participants 
are aware of the relations between elements of the 
grammar and the valence, which make the string more 
or less pleasant. Participants can be unaware of these 
relations for two reasons: First, because they are una-
ware of the grammar, hence they have no conscious 
content to consciously relate with the valence. Second, 
because, even if they are aware of the grammar, they 
are unaware of whether it was paired with a positive or 
a negative affect.2  
If we detect an EC effect in the absence of aware-
ness, this would mean, more specifically, that partici-
pants generalize their evaluations towards new stimuli 
without being aware of the relations between the ele-
ments of the grammar and the affective valence, which 
enable them to make those generalizations.  
Our conceptualization and measure of awareness is 
based on Global availability/global workspace (Baars, 
1997; Dienes, 2012; Shea & Frith, 2019), and, even 
closer, on Higher-order thoughts theories of conscious-
ness (e.g., Rosenthal, 2005), which assume that, in or-
der to be aware of a mental content, one has to have the 
representation that one has the content (see Dienes, 
2008a, 2012; Dienes & Scott, 2005). Accordingly, we 
probe the existence of these meta-representations that 
are necessary for consciousness, by asking participants 
conditioning phase, thus they have no conscious content to con-
sciously relate with a valence or (2) they remember having seen the 
CS, but cannot remember whether it was paired with positive or 
with negative affect. 
Figure 1. The artificial grammars used in the present study (Dienes et al., 1995; Reber, 1967; Norman et al., 2016). 
Strings are generated by following the order permitted by the arrows. For example, XMXRTVM is consistent only with 
grammar A and XMVTRXM is consistent only with grammar B.  
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to report what they know about their knowledge of the 
structures coding the relations between elements of the 
grammar and a valence, that make the string likable or 
dislikeable. If participants exhibit, objectively, 
knowledge of the structures (inferred from the differen-
tial liking of strings that follow the positive versus the 
negative grammar) when they claim that they do not 
have the knowledge, it means that their knowledge of 
the structures is unconscious (cf., e.g., Dienes, 2012; 
Dienes & Scott, 2005; Ling et al., 2018; Seth, Dienes, 
Cleeremans, Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008). We use a 
subjective measure of awareness, since we require par-
ticipants to discriminate between their own mental 
states. Although subjective measures of awareness 
have been previously criticized in the context of EC re-
search, it was typically not their subjective character, 
per se, that has been criticized. Rather, the target of the 
criticism has been the relatively low sensitivity of the 
specific scales used. For instance, they probed the pres-
ence of conscious knowledge via open-ended ques-
tions, which were presented only at the end of the ex-
periment. Hence, participants might underreport con-
scious knowledge (e.g., Sweldens et al., 2014). As pre-
sented in the Method section (and in Supplementary C), 
our measure of awareness differs substantially from the 
subjective measures previously used in EC research, 
and is specifically tailored to address limitations of past 
measures, in the context of our task. 
We hypothesized that (i) there will be an overall 
conditioning effect, (ii) a conditioning effect based on 
unconscious knowledge and, also, (iii) a conditioning 
effect based on conscious knowledge. Furthermore, we 
compared the unconscious with the conscious effects, 
in order to determine (iv) whether awareness enhances 





The hypotheses, procedure, data collection, and sta-




A number of 240 undergraduate students from a Ro-
manian university underwent the task, in exchange for 
course credit; 23 failed the attention/engagement 
checks (see Procedure), therefore the final sample is 
composed of 217 participants (176 women, mage= 19.94 




We employed the two grammars depicted in Figure 
1, and took the strings from Norman et al. (2016). In 
the acquisition/conditioning phase, we presented 32 
strings from each grammar. In the test phase, partici-
pants had to evaluate 20 strings from each grammar. In 
the acquisition phase, the strings from one grammar 
were always presented together with negative images, 
while the strings from the other grammar were always 
presented with positive images. For counterbalancing, 
for some randomly-determined participants, grammar 
A was the positive grammar (and grammar B the nega-
tive one); conversely for the rest of participants. We 
used 23 positive and 23 negative images, taken from 
IAPS (Lang et al., 1997), NAPS (Marchewka et al., 
2014), and OASIS (Kurdi et al., 2017) (see Supplemen-
tary A for the list of images and strings). It was ran-
domly determined which particular image appeared 
with which particular string. 
 
Procedure 
The study was conducted according to the regula-
tions of Babeș-Bolyai University’s Research commit-
tee and with the APA Ethical guidelines. All partici-
pants gave written consent. Data were collected online, 
using gorilla.sc (Anwyl-Irvine et al., 2019). All instruc-
tions and response options were presented in Romanian 
(the original Romanian version and a translated English 
version are presented in Supplementary A). 
Acquisition/conditioning phase. In this phase, par-
ticipants were expected to learn both grammars and to 
associate them with emotions. On each trial, the emo-
tional image appeared first. Then, after 1.5 seconds, the 
string appeared just below the image. The string re-
mained on the screen, together with the image, for 7.5 
seconds, then the next trial began automatically. Partic-
ipants were instructed to memorize which string ap-
pears together with which image. They were not in-
formed that there are regularities in how the strings 
were constructed or that they would have to do a sub-
sequent affective evaluation task. 
The acquisition phase was divided in four blocks: 
two for grammar A and two for grammar B. After each 
block, participants had a 30 seconds break. In each 
block, participants were exposed to all 32 strings from 
one grammar, each string being paired with an emo-
tional image. Thus, in each block, the participant saw 
strings that followed only one grammar and images that 
had only one valence (positive or negative), in order to 
facilitate learning the grammar, by reducing interfer-
ence with the other grammar and to benefit from emo-
tional carry-over effects. It was randomly determined 
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whether the participant was exposed first to the gram-
mar associated with the negative affect or to that asso-
ciated with the positive affect. 
At ten random moments in the acquisition, we pre-
sented, for attention/engagement check purposes, a 
string and an image, and asked participants whether the 
string and the image they saw in that moment were 
identical or not with those from the previous trial. If 
both were identical, the correct answer was “Yes”. If 
either the string or the image was changed, the correct 
answer was “No”. Based on the calibration from a pilot 
study, we excluded participants that made more than 
four mistakes. 
Test phase (valence rating and awareness meas-
ure). Participants were presented with new letter 
strings, without images. They had to evaluate, for every 
string, how much they like or dislike it, using a Likert 
scale with values ranging from -5 (strongly dislike) to 
+5 (strongly like). The scale did not have a neutral point 
(i.e., zero was removed) because while piloting the 
task, participants reported that it felt strange to rate 
preference for meaningless strings of letters, and had 
the tendency to give neutral ratings. Therefore, by re-
moving the neutral point, we intended to constrain par-
ticipants to attend even very subtle positive or negative 
feelings towards the strings (see Eder, Krishna, & Van 
Dessel, in press, for a similar solution). After rating the 
string’s valence, participants had to respond to an 
awareness scale, while the string was still on the 
screen. More specifically, we informed them that they 
might not know what makes some strings likeable/dis-
likeable, but that it is also possible that for some strings 
they might be aware of some “groups or patterns of let-
ters” that make the strings likeable/dislikeable.  The 
scale was adapted from awareness scales that are 
widely-used in AGL (e.g., Dienes & Scott, 2005; Nor-
man et al., 2016; Wierzchon et al., 2012) and in reward 
learning/operant conditioning studies (e.g., Leganes-
Fonteneau, Scott, & Duka, 2018):  
 
To what extent are you aware of what makes the 
string likeable/dislikeable for you?   
1- I don’t have any clue about what makes it 
likeable/dislikeable  
2- I am more or less guessing what makes it like-
able/dislikeable, but I could not describe what 
it is that makes it likeable/dislikeable 
                                                 
3 One reviewer suggested that participants might be aware of 
these relations, but that they might not be aware of their influence. 
This is unlikely, since it would mean that a participant, for example, 
rates positively the string XMXRTVM, is aware that the fragment 
3- I think I know what makes it likeable/dislikea-
ble 
4- I know what makes it likeable/dislikeable 
 
Since the evaluation of a string could be influenced 
by relations between a valence and elements of the 
grammar that were present in that string, if participants 
are aware of these relations, they should be able to iden-
tify, in each string, the grammatical elements that carry 
the affective valence and that make the string pleas-
ant/unpleasant. 3  
Responses 1 and 2 denote that participants are not 
aware of the structures that make the string likea-
ble/dislikeable, while responses 3 and 4 indicate that 
participants have some conscious knowledge of the 
structures (cf. Dienes & Scott, 2005; Ramsøy & Over-
gaard, 2004; Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 2018; 
Wierzchon et al., 2012). In order to decrease the prob-
ability that participants would report as unaware trials 
in which they actually used conscious knowledge, but 
held with low confidence, we explicitly instructed them 
to use response 3 if they have some conscious 
knowledge, even if they do not have much confidence 
in it (see Supplementary C for more details regarding 
the relevance, sensitivity, and reliability of the scale). 
Finally, we collected data regarding age, sex, edu-
cation, and socio-economic status. More specific de-
tails regarding the Stimuli and the Procedure are pre-
sented in Supplementary A and in the preregistration 





We report both Bayes factors and significance tests; 
our conclusions will follow from the Bayes factors, 
though in all cases both approaches lead to the same 
conclusions. In the Bayesian analyses, by convention 
we interpret Bayes factors (B) between 0.33 and 3 as 
insensitive, B between 3 and 10 as providing moderate 
evidence, and B ≥ 10 as providing strong evidence for 
the alternative hypothesis (H1) over H0. Conversely, 
we interpret 1/3 ≤ B <1/10 as moderate evidence, and 
B ≤ 1/10 as strong evidence for H0 over H1. 
For testing the first three hypotheses, the model of 
H1 used in the Bayesian analyses was a half-normal 
with the mode of zero and the SD equal to an expected 
raw effect size of 0.66 (accordingly, the Bayes factor is 
RTV has been paired with a positive valence, has been informed 
that liking/disliking can be generated by groups/patterns of letters, 
but still responds s/he has no clue why s/he rated positively a string 
containing the fragment RTV. 
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noted as BH(0; 0.66); e.g., Dienes, 2008b, 2014; see Sup-
plementary B for the justification of this model, pre-
registered before data collection).  Typically, we would 
report robustness regions for Bayes factors, but in what 
follows the results are so clear there was no need. 
In order to determine whether there was an overall 
conditioning effect, we compared the ratings received 
by all strings that followed the positive grammar with 
those received by the strings that followed the negative  
one, irrespective of the conscious/unconscious basis of 
the evaluation. Table 1 presents mean evaluative rat-
ings received by strings from negative and from posi-
tive grammars. A repeated-measures t-test revealed, as 
expected, that strings from the positive grammar were 
evaluated more positively than those from the negative 
grammar, t(216) = 7.69, p < .00001, Cohen’s dz = 0.52, 
mdiff = 0.538, 95%CI [0.40; 0.67], BH(0; 0.66) = 1012. 
As in typical AGL studies (Dienes & Scott, 2005), 
most participants’ responses (66.05%) were based on 
unconscious knowledge (i.e., responses 1 and 2 at the 
awareness scale). When testing whether there was a 
conditioning effect based on unconscious knowledge 
(Figure 2A), we found, again, that the strings from the 
positive grammar were evaluated more positively than 
those from the negative grammar, t(208) = 4.38, p = 
.00001, dz = 0.30, mdiff = 0.317, 95%CI [0.17; 0.46], 
BH(0; 0.66) = 3,133.45.   
We found the same pattern when we analyzed sep-
arately responses 1 and 2. For response 1: t(192) = 2.34, 
p = .004, dz = 0.20, mdiff = 0.245, 95%CI [0.06; 0.43],  
BH(0; 0.66) = 9.53. For response 2: t(175) = 2.67, p = .01, 
dz = 0.17, mdiff = 0.305, 95%CI [0.05; 1.39], BH(0; 0.66) = 
5.41. The effect was also present when participants re-
lied on conscious knowledge (responses 3 and 4 from 
Table 1.  
Mean evaluative ratings received by strings from the positive and the negative grammar, split on different levels of 
awareness 
 All responses 
(N = 217) 
1&2 
(N = 209) 
1 
(N = 193) 
2 
(N = 176) 
3&4 
(N = 182) 
Positive grammar 0.153 (1.036) -0.279 (1.166) -0.543 (1.370) 0.109 (1.575) 1.218 (1.857) 
Negative grammar -0.386 (1.119) -0.596 (1.120) -0.788 (1.287) -0.196 (1.686) 0.155 (2.103) 
Note.  The values represent means and, those in parentheses, standard deviations.  Ns refer to the number of partici-
pants that used a specific awareness level with strings from both the positive and the negative grammar and that were 
included in the analyses. Ns differ because not all participants had responses for all awareness levels. Numbers on the 
top row refer to awareness levels: 1 - I don’t have any clue…; 2 - I am more or less guessing…; 3- I think I know…; 4 
- I know… .  
 
Figure 2. Evaluative ratings received by strings from the positive and the negative grammars 
when participants used (A) unconscious knowledge and (B) conscious knowledge. 
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the awareness scale; Figure 2B), t(181) = 6.35, p < 
.00001, dz = 0.47, mdiff = 1.06, 95%CI [0.73; 1.39], BH(0; 
0.66) = 8 x 107. Finally, we found that the conditioning 
effect based on conscious knowledge was higher than 
that based on unconscious knowledge, t(173) = 4.60, p 
< .00001, dz = 0.35, mdiff = 0.822, 95%CI [0.47; 1.18], 
BU(0; 1.59) = 11,993. This Bayesian test was conducted 
with a different prior (see Supplementary B).  
In sum, we found strong support for (i) an overall 
conditioning effect, (ii) an effect based on unconscious 
knowledge, (iii) an effect based on conscious 
knowledge, and (iv) that the conscious effect was 





The present study is one of the first to show evi-
dence for EC of complex structures. Moreover, it offers 
evidence that the EC effect generalizes to new stimuli 
that follow the conditioned structures, even in the ab-
sence of subjective awareness of the structures, contra-
dicting previous studies that found affective processing 
only in the presence of awareness (e.g., Lähteenmäki, 
Hyönä, Koivisto, & Nummenmaa, 2015). However, 
consistent with the previous literature, the effect was 
significantly stronger in the presence of conscious 
knowledge, supporting the idea that awareness is an im-
portant moderator of EC (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2010). 
While we believe that the present study can contrib-
ute to the discussions regarding the role of awareness 
in EC and, more broadly, in affective phenomena, it de-
parts substantially from the existing approaches in EC 
research: First, we did not condition individual stimuli, 
but structures followed by stimuli. Consequently, a sec-
ond difference was that we did not measure whether 
participants remembered consciously the valence the 
evaluated strings were paired with (as they were not 
paired directly with any US), but we evaluated whether 
participants were aware of the structures (i.e., of the 
contingencies between elements of the grammars and 
valence) that make each string likeable/dislikeable. 
Third, we subscribed to a subjective definition and 
measurement of awareness, while most previous stud-
ies on the relationship between EC and awareness have 
used objective measurements. In sum, we consider that 
the present study provides evidence for a new phenom-
enon in the family of EC effects, where participants like 
or dislike a previously unseen stimulus, because the 
stimulus follows an emotionally-loaded structure that 
participants are subjectively-unaware of. 
 
Limitations 
Even though we took several measures for ensuring 
that our assessment of awareness is reliable and sensi-
tive, it still has several limitations: First, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that participants inferred, post-hoc, 
parts of the regularities that were associated with posi-
tive and with negative affect. For instance, in the test 
phase, they could notice that a specific group of letters 
always triggers negative affect. Hence, after observing 
this relationship, they responded that they know what 
makes the string negative. Therefore, even though con-
scious knowledge did not play a role in their evaluation 
(as it emerged post-evaluation), this would count, ac-
cording to our scale, as an evaluation based on con-
scious knowledge. This limitation could lead to an un-
derestimation of the unconscious EC effect, because 
some evaluations sustained by unconscious knowledge 
would be attributed to conscious knowledge (cf, e.g., 
Sweldens et al., 2014).  
Second, it is possible that our awareness measure 
did not disentangle all types of knowledge that could 
sustain participants’ evaluations. Specifically, uncon-
scious knowledge could produce generalized EC ef-
fects based on two routes. Let’s assume that a partici-
pant has to evaluate the string XMXRTVM, which fol-
lows the positive grammar, and gives it a positive rat-
ing. First, this could be because the participant holds an 
unconscious association, say, between the trigram RTV 
and the positive valence. In this case, the participant 
holds no conscious knowledge of the association be-
tween elements of the grammar and the emotion, so she 
should use level 1 of the awareness scale (I don’t have 
any clue…). In a second case, the participant has 
learned unconsciously something about the grammar’s 
configuration (e.g., TV appeared after R), and, based 
on her unconscious knowledge of the grammar’s con-
figuration (TV after R), she might be able to judge con-
sciously that the string is somehow similar to the strings 
paired with positive images (even though she doesn’t 
know what makes it similar to those strings; e.g., 
Dienes & Scott, 2005; Norman & Price, 2012). In these 
situations, participants would be likely to use level 3 of 
the awareness scale (I think I know…) but, since they 
cannot fully express the reasons for liking (they do not 
know what makes the string belong to those paired with 
positive images), they could also use level 2 (I am more 
or less guessing…). Even in this case, the fact that the 
conscious judgment of similarity was based on uncon-
scious knowledge of the grammars, enables us to draw 
the conclusion that the detected EC effect was influ-
enced by non-conscious structures (see, for more de-
tails, the distinction between structural and judgment 
 EVALUATIVE CONDITIONING OF ARTIFICIAL GRAMMARS 8 
knowledge from the AGL literature; Dienes & Scott, 
2005). Moreover, the effect appeared even when we ex-
cluded responses based on level 2 of the scale, and took 
into consideration only evaluations based on response 
1 (I don’t have any clue about what makes it likea-
ble/dislikeable), which was designed to exclude any 
type of conscious knowledge.4 
Also, the AGL task has been criticized on the 
grounds that participants can discriminate strings from 
the two grammars not necessarily by acquiring com-
plex structures, but by identifying bigrams and trigrams 
(i.e., successions of two or three letters) that differ be-
tween the grammars. Furthermore, since these bigrams 
and trigrams are relatively simple, they are relatively 
easy to be detected consciously, thus they are some-
times represented explicitly (cf. Dulany, Carlson, & 
Dewey, 1984; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990). However, 
several studies from the past decades, using various im-
plicit learning tasks, have found that even when the reg-
ularities are solely at the level of bigrams and trigrams, 
most of participants’ knowledge is still implicit (e.g., 
Fu, Dienes, & Fu, 2012; Gomez, 1997; Ling et al., 
2018). Thus, it is unwarranted to assume that if partic-
ipants learn bigrams and trigrams, learning is, ipso 
facto, conscious. In the same vein, all previous AGL 
studies that have used the very same grammars and the 
very same acquisition and test strings that we used, 
consistently found evidence for implicit learning 
(Dienes et al., 1995; Wan, Dienes, & Fu, 2008; Nor-
man, Price, & Jones, 2011; Norman et al., 2016, 2019). 
Finally, we conducted additional (non-preregistered) 
analyses on our data which show that, while liking is 
indeed predicted by bigrams and trigrams, it is also pre-
dicted by more complex and abstract types of 
knowledge, which are, presumably, more difficult to be 
consciously detected (see Supplementary B).    
 
Implications and future directions 
A propositional account would have difficulties in 
fully explaining a conditioning effect when participants 
have no conscious knowledge of the structures present 
in a string, since the formation of propositions is as-
sumed to be applicable only to conscious contents (e.g., 
De Houwer, 2018). For situations discussed above, in 
which participants were, presumably, aware that the 
string is somehow related to the strings paired with a 
valence, but were not aware of the grammar elements 
                                                 
4 We consider very unlikely a more extreme scenario, in which 
participants evaluated the string as pleasant because it was similar 
to the strings paired with positive images, and were also aware of 
the elements that make it is similar to the positively-conditioned 
strings, but systematically responded that they have no idea what 
that gave this similarity, relating the string with a va-
lence could be explained by the formation of conscious 
propositions (e.g., since the string is more similar to 
those paired with positive valence, the string is pleas-
ant/likeable). However, the acquisition of unconscious 
structures, which were responsible for ensuring the 
similarity, cannot be explained by the formation of 
propositions, but rather by the formation of associa-
tions between the elements of the grammar. Cases 
where participants lacked any kind of conscious 
knowledge leave even less room for an influence of 
propositions, but, again, these situations might be ex-
plained by the unconscious formation of associations 
between elements of the grammar, and between ele-
ments of the grammar and a valence (e.g., Greenwald 
& De Houwer, 2017; see Corneille & Stahl, 2019, for a 
discussion).  More precise data on the conscious/un-
conscious status of all types of knowledge acquired in 
this task (knowledge of the grammars, knowledge of 
the grammar-valence contingencies) would also enable 
more precise discussions regarding the nature of the 
representations responsible for the detected generalized 
EC effect. 
Beyond the EC literature, our results are also com-
patible with those from research on affect misattribu-
tion (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2003; but see 
Simonsohn, 2014 and Cummins, Hussey, & Hughes, 
2019), which has claimed that participants are not al-
ways able to identify accurately what influences their 
affective responses. For example, they can attribute 
their negative affect to a low life satisfaction, even 
though the negative affect was actually generated by a 
rainy weather (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Thus, in these 
studies, participants exhibit affective influences from 
stimuli they are aware of (e.g., they are aware that the 
weather is rainy), while being unaware of their influ-
ence (i.e., think something else exerts the influence).  
Our study presents a particular case of incapacity to 
consciously detect the causes for one’s affective evalu-
ations, in which the causes are newly-acquired, condi-
tioned, structures, and in which the influence is gener-
alized to previously-unseen stimuli that fit those struc-
tures. Moreover, in the present study, the causes them-
selves (i.e. the associations between elements of the 
makes the string positive . This scenario would invalidate our con-
clusion, that nonconscious structures had an influence on the EC 
effect, but given the measures we took for ensuring the validity of 
our awareness scale, we consider it highly implausible.   
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grammar and a valence) were unaware, not only their 
influence.5  
Future studies should try to assess awareness for dif-
ferent components that can contribute to the detected 
EC effect: In addition to awareness of the relations be-
tween elements of the grammar and the valence, they 
should also assess awareness that a string belongs to 
the positively- or to the negatively-conditioned gram-
mar and awareness of the grammar elements that 
makes the string belong to that grammar. This would 
help to determine whether, as explained above, the 
combination of unconscious knowledge of the gram-
mars but with conscious knowledge of the similarity 
(Dienes & Scott, 2005), is indeed involved in produc-
ing the EC effect. 
Future studies could also investigate additional 
characteristics of the revealed EC effect, such as its au-
tomaticity or controllability. For instance, in affective-
priming tasks, stimuli with emotional valence automat-
ically enhance the detection of stimuli with the same 
valence (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; 
Ivanchei & Asvarich, 2018). Using the present para-
digm, participants might undergo an affective-priming 
task in which primes could be new strings that follow 
the positive or the negative grammar. Another ap-
proach would be to adopt process-dissociation meth-
ods, as those often used in AGL (e.g., Norman et al., 
2016) and EC research (e.g., Hütter et al., 2014), and to 
test whether participants can voluntarily control the in-
fluence of the acquired structures. 
Other essential properties regard the malleability of 
consciously- and unconsciously-based EC effects. It 
would be important to determine whether extinction of 
the EC effect is achieved in different time frames when 
the effect is sustained by conscious versus unconscious 
knowledge; or whether, for example, there are differ-
ences in the amount of exposure needed to positively 
condition a structure that has been initially conditioned 
negatively, as a function of conscious versus uncon-
scious status of knowledge or of the associative versus 
propositional representations sustaining the EC effect 
(cf. Mann, Kurdi, & Banaji, 2019).   
In conclusion, the present study proposes a novel 
experimental paradigm in EC research, in which eval-
uations are based on structures, provides evidence that 
                                                 
5 When the real causes are conscious (e.g., participants are aware 
that the weather is rainy), the misattribution effect is claimed to ap-
pear only when participants’ attention is actively directed, via ex-
perimental manipulation, towards the mistaken cause (e.g., they are 
asked explicitly about their life satisfaction, but no mention is made 
about the weather). When the manipulation hints, even subtly, to 
the real causes (e.g., by asking participants about the weather), the 
misattribution effect is claimed to disappear (see also Cummins et 
EC effects can generalize in the absence of subjective 
awareness of the conditioned structures, and, more gen-
erally, that subjectively non-conscious structures can 
influence affective responses. 
 
 
Context of the Research 
 
 We are often able to evaluate whether a sentence is 
grammatically correct or incorrect, even without being 
able to explain why it is so. Thus, our evaluations can 
be based on complex non-conscious knowledge about 
word associations permitted by a certain language. Can 
knowledge that we are unaware of also influence our 
affective evaluations? We show in this study that we 
can learn very complex associations between neutral 
stimuli and positive or negative emotions, and that 
these associations can remain outside awareness, but 
still influence our affective judgments. 
For research on unconsciously-based affective phe-
nomena, this approach based on learning complex as-
sociations presents advantages over existing methods: 
it permits the use of strong, supraliminal, stimuli (as 
opposed to the methods using subliminal exposure), 
and, also, it keeps participants unaware of the regulari-
ties in most of the trials (as opposed to some of the stud-
ies using simple CS-US relations). Accordingly, while 
not without limitations (e.g., it doesn’t afford a direct 
manipulation of awareness, as in the case of subliminal 
exposure), it could complement existing approaches in 
the study of unconscious emotional learning.  
We are interested to test in future studies whether 
unconscious evaluative and fear conditioning based on 
such complex structures can occur in more ecologi-
cally-relevant contexts, with regards to more realistic 






al., 2019). In contrast, in our task, participants’ attention was ac-
tively directed towards the real causes for the evaluation (i.e., were 
told that the affective valence can be carried by groups or patterns 
of letters), thus we have little reason to suspect that in trials in which 
participants claimed to have no conscious knowledge, they were ac-
tually aware of the structures and were unaware only of their influ-
ence. 
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